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We use the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of Altig et al. (2005) to
analyse the resilience of an economy in the face of external shocks. The term resilience refers to
the ability of an economy to propser in the face of shocks. The Altig et al. model was chosen
because it combined both demand and supply shocks and because various market
rigidities/imperfections, which have the potential to affect resilience, are modelled. We consider
the level of expected discounted utility to be the relevant measure of resilience. The effect of
market rigidities, eg. wage and price stickiness, on the expected level of utility is minimal. The
effect on utility is especially small when compared to the effect of market competition, because
the latter has a direct effect on the level of output. This conclusion holds for the family of
constant relative risk aversion over consumption utility functions. A similar conclusion was
drawn by Lucas (1987) regarding the costs of business cycles. We refer to the literature that
followed Lucas for ideas for how a DSGE model might be adjusted to give a more meaningful
analysis of resilience. We conclude that the Altig et al. DSGE model does not produce a
relationship between rigidities and the level of output and, hence, does not capture the effect of
inﬂexibility on utility that one observes colloquially.
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Abstract in Dutch
In dit paper analyseren wij de resilience van de Nederlandse economie. Het begrip resilience
refereert aan het aanpassingsvermogen van een economie onderhavig aan een externe schok.
Voor deze analyse gebruiken wij het dynamische stochastische algemeen evenwichtsmodel van
Altig et al.(2005). Dit model biedt de mogelijkheid om vraag- en aanbodschokken te simuleren
en een verscheidenheid aan marktrigiditeiten en imperfecties te onderzoeken op hun effect op de
resilience van een economie. Als relatieve maat voor de resilience beschouwen wij de verwachte
waarde van het verdisconteerde nut. Het effect van marktrigiditeiten, bijv. in het loon of in de
prijs, op deze verwachte waarde is minimaal. Deze effecten zijn zeker beperkt als wij hen
vergelijken met het effect van concurrentie op resilience, dat een direct effect heeft op het niveau
van de productie. Deze conclusie geldt onder voorbehoud van een constante relatieve
risicoaverse nutsfunctie over consumptie. Lucas (1987) trekt een vergelijkbare conclusie voor de
kosten van een business cycle. Op basis van dit paper en de afgeleide literatuur presenteren wij
ideeën om het DSGE model uit te breiden voor een uitgebreidere analyse van resilience. Wij
concluderen dat het DSGE model van Altig et al. geen directe relatie oplevert tussen de
rigiditeiten en het productieniveau, waardoor het bekende effect van inﬂexibiliteit op het nut
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Whilst resilience is a commonly heard expression in policy discussions, there is no universally
accepted deﬁnition. With regards to the macroeconomy we often think of a resilient economy as
one that remains close to potential output in an international environment that is changing
rapidly or is subject to shocks, such as high oil prices. Our working deﬁnition of a resilient
economy is an economy in which the level of expected discounted utility is not lowered by a
given series of shocks. The focus on utility ensures that our conclusions are based on the welfare
of individual agents, not on things like output volatility that may not be of concern to agents per
se. We discuss four key issues with regards resilience: the deﬁnition of shocks; candidate
deﬁnitions of resilience from the literature; the mechanisms involved in transmitting shocks to
the real economy; and ﬁnally, the effect of shocks on welfare.
Our central question is whether price rigidity, wage rigidity and capital adjustment affect
utility levels in the face of unexpected shocks. In light of the recent developments in macro
modelling we use the model of Altig et al. (2005) to analyse the effects of variations in price
ﬂexibility, wage ﬂexibility and capital adjustment costs on the level of utility in the face of
demand and supply shocks.
The Altig et al. model is a micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
calibrated to the US economy. That is, the model of the macroeconomy is built up from
maximising agents, whereby households maximise utility and ﬁrms maximise proﬁts. Therefore,
the characteristics of the model can be traced back to the ‘deep’ parameters of agents such as the
curvature of the utility function, the degree of competition in markets or the degree of habit
formation in consumption decisions. The Altig et al. model allows us to model price and wage
rigidity separately so we can distinquish the effects of labour market and product market
ﬂexibility. The model also allows us to look at the ﬂexibility of capital markets through
adjustments to the parameter governing capital adjustment costs.
The utility function in the model is increasing in consumption and decreasing in hours
worked. Moreover, the consumption term is measured relative to the last period - that is, the
utility function displays consumption smoothing. It is therefore the impact of shocks on
consumption and hours worked that will determine the resilience of an economy by our
deﬁntion. In our model simulations, the magnitude of the responses of output, consumption and
hours depend critically on the degree of rigidity in the three markets. However, when the effects
of the simulated deviations around trend growth on expected lifetime utility are compared, the
degree of rigidity in the three markets has very little effect. A widely used deﬁnition of resilience
is based on how quickly output returns to equilibrium; if we had used that deﬁnition we would
have concluded that the rigidity parameters were important determinants of resilience. By
focusing on expected lifetime utility we can see that there is not a simple one-to-one relationship
between the movements of the macro aggregates and welfare.
7The effects on utility are especially small when the utility losses associated with shocks are
compared with the utility effects of other possible policy interventions, such as increasing
product market competition. This is because, at the level of the macro aggregates there is little
uncertainty: the level of consumption only varies slightly. In addition to this, the class of utility
functions we have investigated are almost linear in this small area around the steady state.
Therefore, over the lifetime of an agent, the utility effects of positive and negative shocks just
about cancel each other out.
Our conclusion could be rephrased as the costs of business cycles are small. This subject has
received considerable attention in the literature. Lucas (1987) studied the costs of business
cycles by calculating how much lifetime consumption an individual would be willing to give up
to face a certain future consumption stream rather than a volatile stream. Using a constant
relative risk aversion utility function he concluded that the costs of business cycles are small. He
calculated that individuals would give up at most 0.1% of lifetime consumption to remove
business cycles. In essence this is the same result that we have found.
Finally, we use the response to Lucas’ results to suggest potential extensions to the Altig et
al. model: any realistic analysis of the resilience of an economy requires a model to include
unemployment and imperfect credit markets. Not only does lower equilibrium unemployment
induce an effect on the level of output in the economy but modelling unemployment also moves
away from equal, across the board effects on hours following shocks. Credit market
imperfections are important because with perfect credit markets agents could insure themselves
against loss of income and shocks would again have little effect on utility.
We also draw on the literature to speculate what such an extended model would look like if it
were calibrated to the Dutch economy. The literature suggests that prices are less ﬂexible in the
Netherlands than the parameter estimated from US data in the Altig et al. model, whilst there is
no clear consensus on the relative ﬂexibility of wages.
81 Introduction
Resilience is a commonly heard expression in policy discussions, but what do we mean by
resilience? In colloquial terms resilience suggests the ability to adjust or recover from
misfortune. With regards to the macroeconomy we often think of a resilient economy as one that
remains close to potential output in an international environment that is changing rapidly or is
subject to shocks, such as high oil prices.
The academic literature makes little mention of the term resilience, although the response of
economies to shocks has been the subject of many studies. For example, in 1986 De Long and
Summers asked if increased price ﬂexibility is stabilising when an economy is subjected to
demand and supply shocks. They found that, as expected, greater nominal ﬂexibility is always
stabilising at the margin in response to supply shocks. However, unless the economy is very
close to an ideal contingent-claims Walrasian economy, greater nominal ﬂexibility is
destabilising at the margin in response to demand shocks. Modern macroeconomic modelling
techniques are considerably more sophisticated than those used by De Long and Summers over
20 years ago. Recently, research on shocks and output variability has been done by, among
others, Cecchetti and Ehrmann (looking at the effects of monetary policy regime, 1999), Ramey
and Ramey (looking at the link between volatility and growth, 1995), Ahmed et al. (who dismiss
policy as causing lower output variation, 2004) Irvine et al. (looking at the role of inventories,
2002), Kose et al. (looking at the role of international ﬁnancial ﬂows, 2003) and Koskela et al
(looking at the role of government size, 2003).
In light of the recent developments in macro modelling we use the model of Altig et al.
(2005) to analyse the effects of variations in price ﬂexibility, wage ﬂexibility and capital
adjustment costs on the level of utility in the face of demand and supply shocks. An economy in
which the level of expected discounted utility is not lowered by a given series of shocks is our
working deﬁnition of a resilient economy. We chose the Altig et al. model because it has a
number of attractive features for the current study. Firstly, by modelling price and wage rigidity
separately we can look at the effects of labour market and product market ﬂexibility separately.
The model also allows us to look at the ﬂexibility of capital markets through adjustments to the
parameter governing capital adjustment costs. In that sense we can compare the relative
importance of product, labour and capital market ﬂexibility for resilience.
Our model simulations suggest that deviations around trend output have a much smaller
impact on utility than the changes in the level of output. Furthermore, the effects of price
rigidity, wage rigidity and capital adjustment costs on the utility loss associated with deviations
from trend are small.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how shocks are
deﬁned and the competing deﬁnitions of resilience. The adjustment mechanisms used to respond
to shocks are discussed in Section 3. The effects of policies and institutions on these adjustment
9mechanisms are also considered. Section 4 introduces the Altig et al. ( 2005) model. Section 5
contains the results of our model simulations. Section 6 interprets these results and discusses the
limitations of the current paper, whilst Section 7 concludes.
102 What is meant by resilience?
In layman’s terms, resilience can be thought of as the ability to adjust or absorb a shock. This
brings up two key questions: What do we mean by shocks? How do we deﬁne resilience?
2.1 Shocks
Empirical work, especially that using the VAR methodology, usually deﬁnes shocks as simply
those variations in a given series that cannot be explained by the empirical model being used.
This is broader than the deﬁnition used by Karanassou et al. (2004) who deﬁne a shock S at
period t as the change in an exogenous variable Xi from some ﬁxed point in time T (base period)
to period t: Sit = Xit −XiT,where t > T. The distinction between deﬁning shocks as affecting
only exogenous variables or affecting all variables reﬂects the emphasis of a study. Studies
employing the exogenous shocks only deﬁnition are primarily interested in analysing the effects
of non-domestic shocks, which are often thought of as exogenous variables. The all variables
deﬁnition is broader than and encompasses the exogenous only deﬁnition. Regardless, shocks
are unexpected and unpredictable.
It is almost always of interest to distinguish between different classes of shocks. This is most
usefully done as a series of dichotomies. It is natural in economics to distinguish between
demand and supply shocks, such as done by Blanchard and Quah (1989). In empirical work,
demand and suply shocks are often deﬁned by their effects on the economy rather than being
from some underlying supply or demand system. For example, supply shocks are deﬁned by
Blanchard and Quah as those shocks that have a permanent effect on the level of output whereas
demand shocks do not. However, it is also possible to think of transitory supply shocks such as a
temporary increase in a factor of production, such as labour. This discussion of deﬁnition by
effect leads to another common distinction that is often made between permanent structural
shocks, such as the rise of China, and temporary shocks, such as one-off tax. Empirically, in a
stationary world the distinction between permanent and temporary shocks is simple: a temporary
shock is where the impulse itself returns to zero, whereas a permanent shock does not. However,
in a world with integrated processes single, one-period impulses can have permanent effects. In
light of this it is probably easier to use a strict deﬁnition of temporary shocks: those whose
effects die out over time rather than those where the impulse itself dies out. Permanent shocks
are those that have lasting effects.
It may also be of interest to look at which markets the shocks originate in, such as capital
markets, labour markets or goods markets. A distinction can also be made between shocks in
domestic and foreign markets. For example, strong wage demands by employees may undermine
the international competitiveness of an economy, as well as having a number of effects in
domestic markets. A similar shock in a foreign country may well look more like a demand shock
11from the point of view of domestic industry. Some of the most important and lasting shocks are
external or even global shocks. Examples of such global shocks are advances in technology like
the ICT revolution that have the potential to affect all countries. The ICT revolution has not
affected all countries in the same way: some countries are initiators and some followers.
Similarly, oil price shocks affect all economies, although not necessarily symmetrically across
countries. Oil price shocks will have different effects in heavily oil dependent importing
countries than they will have in the OPEC countries. Another important distinction between
domestic and foreign shocks is that policy makers can potentially go directly to the source of the
domestic shock to mitigate its effects, whereas this is unlikely to be possible with external
shocks. For example, if workers in a domestic industry strike the government can get involved in
negotiations to end the strike. This is not possible if workers in a foreign industry strike.
Shocks can be positive or negative. The importance of the distinction between positive and
negative shocks is related to the question whether the economy displays asymmetric responses to
shocks. For example, the effects of an oil price rise may be larger than the effects of a fall.
However, the asymmetric distribution of oil price movements (large rises are more frequent than
large falls) has made this point difﬁcult to establish empirically.
In the Altig et al. model there are three types of shock. These are a money shock and two
technology shocks. There is quite some history in macroeconomics of using money shocks as a
proxy for general aggregate demand shocks and the same is true for the use of technology shocks
to represent supply shocks.
2.2 Resilience
No clear, universally accepted, deﬁnition of resilience exists in the literature. The deﬁnition used
in each study appears to depend on the model being used. For example, according to Drew et al.
(2004), resilience can be thought of as how quickly an economy returns to equilibrium following
a shock. Whilst this appears a natural deﬁnition at ﬁrst sight, it takes no account of the severity
of disequilibria, which is also important. For instance, consider two economies, one where GDP
goes to zero for 6 months following a shock before returning to potential and one where GDP is
lowered by 5% for 7 months. Since only the duration is measured the ﬁrst economy would be
regarded as more resilient on this measure. This does not tally with a colloquial understanding of
resilience since the total amount of consumption foregone is much higher in the former than the
latter.
In contrast, Briguglio et al. (2005) deﬁne resilience by way of an analogy: that of resilience
to exposure to the inﬂuenza virus. There are at least three senses in which resilience is
understood. In the event that a person is exposed to the virus, she may: (a) get infected, but
recover quickly; (b) withstand the effect of the virus, possibly by having been immunised; (c)
avoid the virus altogether by having stayed away from infected sources. This paper will focus on
12the ﬁrst two components of this analogy as they relate to an economy: (a) the ability of an
economy to recover quickly following adverse shocks; (b) the ability to withstand shocks or the
sensitivity of an economy to shocks. As far as the second part of this deﬁnition is concerned, it is
often possible to use ﬁnancial instruments to insure oneself against the effects of shocks. For
example, in the face of temporary shocks to income, consumers can continue to enjoy a steady
utility level by consuming out of accumulated saving or by borrowing in ﬁnancial markets. The
ability of an economy to avoid shocks, which is analogous to point c is not considered in our
model. This type of resilience is considered to be inherent, and can be considered as the opposite
of economic vulnerability.
Vulnerability is deﬁned as the proneness of an economy to exogenous shocks lying outside
its control (Briguglio et al., 2005). The risk of being adversely affected by an external shock is a
combination of two elements: vulnerability (exposure to external shocks arising from intrinsic
features of the economy such as economic openness) and resilience (coping ability enabling the
country to withstand or bounce back from adverse shocks). Vulnerability is inherent in the
structure of the economy, such as how diversiﬁed the industry of an economy is, and depends on
different factors to resilience. They therefore require different policy or governance measures if
one wishes to decrease the vulnerability or increase the resilience of an economy. In this paper
we only investigate resilience.
13143 Key mechanisms
We can translate the analogy of Briguglio et al. into the traditional language of macroeconomics
by talking about equilibrium mechanisms instead of the ability to recover quickly and by talking
about transmission mechanisms instead of the ability to withstand shocks. To fully discuss
transmission mechanisms and equilibrium mechanisms for all shocks impacting an economy
would require an encyclopedia of modern macroeonomics and will not be done here. However, it
is fruitful to highlight a number of key mechanisms operating to bring speciﬁc markets back to
equilibrium and to discuss some institutions affecting the mechanisms at work. We focus on
those mechanisms often heard in the context of resilience. The discussion procedes on a
market-by-market basis covering labour markets, goods markets and capital markets.
In a market economy prices send signals to agents. If too little of a good or service is brought
to market, the price per unit will appear too low and agents will bid the price up to the market
clearing price. Thus the economy is once more in equilibrium. In textbook economics this
occurs quickly, but in reality it may take much longer.
In labour markets, when the price of labour is too high there is involuntary unemployment.
There are a number of reasons why wages will not fall in response to excess supply. We mention
causes of nominal wage rigidity including union bargaining and insider-outsider theory (see
Lindbeck and Snower, 1989) and efﬁciency wages (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). The views
on wage rigidity are diverse; some neoclassical economists, such as Lucas and Rapping (1969),
argue that wage rigidity is an illusion and the key reason that unemployment rises in recession is
that market wages fall below reservation wages. Bewley (2002) argues that the traditional
explanations do not adequately explain wage rigidity. He provides a review of mainstream
theories and extensive survey evidence that the main causes of wage rigidity are social. His main
conclusion is that cutting wages lowers employee morale and, in turn, reduces worker effort. A
similar ﬁnding is reported by Campbell and Kamlani (1997). An important possible
consequence of involuntary unemployment is hysteresis. When workers have been unemployed
for lengthy periods of time they lose skills and become long-term unemployed. This implies that
one-off shocks can have permanent effects on the real economy through hysteresis effects.
Similarly, price (or inﬂation) rigidity has important consequences in goods markets.
Andersen (1994) reviews theories of price rigidity noting that these can be split into two types:
nominal rigidities and real rigidities. Theoretical causes of nominal rigidities include, for
instance, menu costs, whereby it is costly to change prices or contracted prices where prices are
literally ﬁxed for a given period of time into the future. The policy credibility literature is also
relevant here in that agents take into account expected policy developments when negotiating
contracted prices. Product market competition affects real price rigidity. Prices set by any given
ﬁrm in a speciﬁc market depend on the prices set by the other ﬁrms. Product market competition
and industry structure are important determinants of this ‘strategic complementarity in price
15setting’. Goods market rigidity can feed through into labour markets and vice versa.
Capital markets play an important role in allocating resources across ﬁrms and industries in
an economy. Imperfections in capital markets have the potential to slow down or even prevent
adjustment to shocks by inhibiting the process of withdrawing capital from unproductive uses
and reallocating it to more productive uses.
Our approach models the ability of prices and wages to accurately reﬂect underlying market
conditions by the speed with which prices and wages change on average. This is implemented by
giving each ﬁrm (worker) a ﬁxed probability of being able to reset its price (wage) each period.
The lower the probability, the greater the potential misalignment between demand and supply.
We model capital adjustment costs by creating a wedge between investment expenditures and the
resulting increase in the capital stock. The larger the wedge, the larger the capital adjustment
costs.
164 The Altig et al. model
No model can possibly hope to address all of the points raised above so we have chosen a model
that enables us to look at an important selection of these. The model chosen is that of Altig et al.
(2005); it represents the state of the art of New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model building. These models are current practice in the academic
literature combining a microfounded structural approach with an ability to mimic the properties
of empirical models, such as VAR models. The remainder of this section outlines the model.
The model of Altig et al. (2005) allows us to look at the effects of labour market, goods
market and capital market inﬂexibilities in response to supply and demand shocks. The model
also enables us to compare the effects of the rigidities with the effect of product and labour
market competition. As discussed in the previous section, prices play a key role in allocating
resources in a market economy.
It is a micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. That is, the model of
the macroeconomy is built up from maximising agents, whereby households maximise utility
and ﬁrms maximise proﬁts. Therefore, the characteristics of the model can be traced back to the
‘deep’ parameters of agents such as the curvature of the utility function, the degree of
competition in markets or the degree of habit formation in consumption decisions. These
parameters are thought to be less likely to depend on the speciﬁc policy regime under which the
model is estimated; hence, we can be more conﬁdent that when we undertake policy experiments
in the model we are not subject to the Lucas critique.
The model comprises four blocks: households, ﬁnal goods market ﬁrms, intermediate goods
market ﬁrms and monetary policy. Households maximise utility, which depends positively on the
level of consumption of the ﬁnal consumption good and negatively on the hours of labour they
supply to intermediate goods ﬁrms. Final goods ﬁrms are perfectly competitive (they are price
takers) and take the output of intermediate ﬁrms and aggregate it into the ﬁnal good.
Intermediate goods ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive, which is modelled using the
Dixit-Stiglitz approach. They set prices and output to maximise proﬁts. To produce their output,
the intermediate ﬁrms use capital, which they own themselves (that is, capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc),
and a differentiated labour input, which is supplied by households. Finally there is a monetary
authority who controls the money supply.
The demand shocks come from shocks to the money supply. There is a longer history of
using monetary shocks to proxy as general demand shocks in macroeconomics (see, Romer,
2000, chapter 6, for examples). The supply shocks come from two different types of technology
shocks, one to labour productivity and one to the price of investment goods.
174.1 The ﬁnal goods sector









, 1 ≤ λf ≤ ¥. (4.1)
The ﬁnal goods sector is perfectly competitive. The parameter λf measures the degree of
competition in the market. This parameter also inﬂuences the degree of strategic
complementarity in price setting for intermediate ﬁrms, if we follow Woodford’s (2003)
terminology, or the degree of real rigidity if we follow Romer (2000). The degree of strategic
complementarity in price setting measures how willing ﬁrms are to have prices that are different
from those set by other ﬁrms. For example, in a perfectly competitive market you must set your
price equal to all other ﬁrms but as a market becomes less competitive ﬁrms can charge a
different price to others and still face a ﬁnite demand. In the extreme case of highly
differentiated goods, a ﬁrm doesn’t have any direct competitors and is free to choose it’s own
price. In conjunction with proﬁt maximisation, this also gives a price level determination








, 1 ≤ λf ≤ ¥, (4.2)
where pt (i) is the price of the ith intemediate good.
4.2 The intermediate goods sector
The intermediate goods sector is monopolistically competitive. This means that there are many
different ﬁrms whose products are similar but not perfect substitutes for each other. Each














where, Kt(i) is the capital employed in industry i and ht(i) is the labour input in industry i,
measured in hours. The parameter zt represents neutral technology and the parameter z∗
t
represents the overall level of technology. The overall technology level, z∗
t , depends on the level






φ parameterises ﬁxed costs assuring equilibrium proﬁts to be zero in steady state, ie. there is no
entry or exit into markets in this model. Normally, in a model with exogenous growth, all real
steady state variables will grow at the exogenous rate of technological progress including proﬁts.
18This raises the question of how many new ﬁrms will enter the market, and how they do so. This
is an unnecessary complication which is avoided by the adjustment employed here.
But what do we mean by capital embodied technology? It basically means that there is one
process for turning inputs into consumption goods, as shown in equation 2.4, and a different
process for turning consumption goods into investment goods. This relationship is assumed to be
linear: It = ¡tCt. That is, a positive embodied technology shock makes it cheaper in terms of
consumption goods to make one unit of investment goods.
The distinction between neutral and embodied technology is quite ‘hot’ in the academic
literature currently, reviving the ‘do technology shocks drive the business cycle?’ argument (see
Fisher, 2002, who argues that embodied technology shocks are an important driving force
behind the business cycle). In the 1980s when Real Business Cycle models based upon rational
maximising agents were ﬁrst introduced, all of the variation in output across business cycles was
attributed to technology shocks. Later, models were developed in which monetary shocks
accounted for 70 per cent of the observed variation. However, empirical studies found no
evidence of money being so important. The question naturally arose whether money or
technology shocks really drive the business cycle. Recent studies, including the Altig et al.
study, have managed to come closer to the empirical data by incorporating neutral technology.












As mentioned above, the growth rates of the technology parameters follow autoregressive





ˆ µz,t = ρµz ˆ µz,t−1+εµz,t, (4.6)
ˆ µ¡,t = ρµ¡ ˆ µ¡,t−1+εµ¡,t. (4.7)
4.2.1 Timing
The timing of decisions is essential in our model. The intermediate goods ﬁrms observe the level
of technology, then set their prices. Subsequently the shock to monetary policy is realised, which
determines the level of demand. Finally ﬁrms choose quantities of capital and labour to satisfy
the level of demand at the prices they have already set.















In words, ﬁrms maximise the discounted sum of future proﬁts. The ﬁrst term with the brackets is
the revenue in period t. The second term is the cost of the labour input, where it is assumed that
19the ﬁrm must borrow at gross rate Rt to pay for the cost of wages, wt, up front. The third term is
the cost associated with capital utilisation, a(ut(i)), and capital accumulation (ie. investment). In
the ACEL model, capital is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, which means that ﬁrms own their own capital and the
rate of return to capital does not have to be equal across all ﬁrms at all times.
However, not all intermediate goods ﬁrms get to re-optimise prices every turn because of
nominal rigidity. Intermediate goods ﬁrms set prices according to the Calvo (1983) mechanism.
That is, there is a constant probability, 1−ξw, that each ﬁrm will be able to reoptimise its
nominal price. Otherwise prices are updated by the inﬂation rate in the last period. That is, they
are set according to
Pt (i) = πt−1Pt−1(i). (4.9)
It is costly to adjust capital around the steady state. The capital stock employed by a given
industry is composed of the capital stock last period adjusted for depreciation at rate, δ, plus the
amount of new capital added by investment. Since there are adjustment costs the amount of new
capital added by investment takes the form of the function F(.).









The function S(.) parameterises the adjustment costs. Evaluated at the steady state the level,
S(.) = 0, and the ﬁrst derivative, S0(.) = 0; adjustment costs are imposed through the second
derivative.
4.3 Households
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t )+Aj,t




















where log is the natural logarithm. This function is a special case of the Constant Relative Risk
Aversion family of preferences over consumption. This formulation of preferences incorporates
consumption smoothing through the parameter b; agents evaluate utility from consumption
relative to what they consumed last period. Households dislike work, which is modelled
20quadratically through hours worked, h. The budget constraint of the household can be broken
down into parts. The ﬁrst part, Rt (Mt −Qt +(xt −1)Ma
t ), represents the interest paid on start of
period money balances, Mt, plus cash balances, Qt, plus the monetary injection from the central
bank, Ma
t , which grows at rate, xt. The following four variables are net cash inﬂow from state
contingent securities, Aj,t, wage income,Wj,thj,t, cash and the household’s share of proﬁts, Qt.
This must equal nominal expenditure, (1+η (Vt))PtCt, and money balances taken to the next
period, Mt+1. Following Erceg et al. (2000), households supply a differentiated labour service,










where Ht is the aggregated labour input into production. As in the case with intermediate goods,
λw, measures the degree of competition in labour markets and the degree of strategic
complementarity in wage setting for households. Wage rigidity is also modelled with a Calvo
mechanism with parameter ξw.
4.4 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is modelled as a policy rule that automatically adjusts the money supply in the
face of shocks. It is assumed that the monetary authority can immediately distinguish between
the three shocks. The growth rate of the money supply, ˆ xt, can then be written as as combination
of the monetary response to each of the three shocks
ˆ xt = ˆ xzt + ˆ xMt + ˆ x¡t (4.15)
where ˆ xzt is the monetary response to money supply shocks, ˆ x¡t is the response to embodied
technology and ˆ xMt is the response to neutral technology. The individual responses are modelled
as ARMA processes as follows
ˆ xM,t = ρxM ˆ xM,t−1+εM,t, (4.16)
ˆ xz,t = ρxz ˆ xz,t−1+czεz,t +cp
z εz,t−1, (4.17)
ˆ x¡,t = ρx¡ ˆ x¡,t−1+c¡ε¡,t +c
p
¡ε¡,t−1. (4.18)
Here, εM,t is a monetary policy shock, εz,t is an innovation in neutral technology and ε¡,t−1 is an
innovation in capital embodied technology.
4.5 Calibration
The model is solved for the steady state and then linearised around the steady state. The
linearised model is calibrated to reproduce as closely as possible the stylised facts as given by a
VAR analysis. That is, a VAR model with comparable data for the US is estimated and the
21responses of the VAR model to monetary, neutral technology and embodied technology shocks
are calculated. The DSGE model is then calibrated to reproduce these responses as closely as
possible. The calibration results in each of the three shocks being responsible for about a third of
the variation in output (see Altig et al. for more details). As described in Christiano et al. (2005),








where ˆ Y denotes VAR responses, Y denotes DSGE model responses and V denotes a diagonal
matrix of sample variances of the ˆ Y.
4.6 Discussion - using a closed economy model
The model we have described here contains no foreign variables and no exchange rates: it is a
closed economy model. It may seem strange for modellers interested in applications to a small
open economy like the Netherlands to be using a closed economy model. This seemingly strange
choice comes from difﬁculties encountered when modelling an open monetary economy with
free capital ﬂows. We need a monetary model in order for nominal price rigidity to have any
meaning. According to Neiss and Nelson (2003) each monetary model used for policy analysis
should include the following three features
1. Central bank control of nominal rates and considerable control of short-term real rates
2. Inﬂation persistance
3. Investment in physical capital very important for cyclical ﬂuctuations and adjustment
Open-economy DSGE models have difﬁculties capturing these features. Either there is no
endogenous variation in short-term real rates, no inﬂation persistance (McCallum and Nelson,
2000) or no endogenous physical capital. To circumvent this shortcoming, Neiss and Nelson
propose adjusting the parameters of their closed-economy model to approximate an
open-economy. They achieve this by making consumption more interest elastic than standard
estimates of the elasticity of domestic consumption to real interest rates suggest. Note that in a
standard closed-economy DSGE model, consumption depends on current and future real interest
rates through the Euler equation. Net exports depends on the real exchange rate and hence on the
current and future real interest rates as well. The non-investment aggregate demand, ie.
consumption in a closed economy model, proxies for non-investment aggregate demand in an
open-economy, as consumption is augemented with net exports.
Neiss and Nelson go in to detail that US data (see Hall, 1988; McCallum and Nelson, 1999;
Fuhrer, 2000; and Ireland, 2000) indicates an interest elasticity of consumption of 0.2. Neiss and
Nelson use a value of 0.6 for the UK. The Netherlands is smaller still and, as a result of being in
the single currency, should be even more interest elastic. The ACEL model, by virtue of the log
22utility, has an interest elasticity of consumption of 1. Hence, following the Neiss and Nelson
argument, the value of one yields an appropriate value for the small, open-economy of the
Netherlands. Moreover, log utility is widely used in the DSGE literature.
Given the current state of the DSGE literature we are left with a choice: either use an
open-economy model and ignore capital markets, or use a closed-economy model as an
approximation to an open-economy. Since the importance of capital markets is an important
element of the resilience debate, the latter option appeared to be the lesser of two evils.
4.7 Simulating the model
The model is simulated by generating a series of exogenous variables, st, to feed into the model
st = Pst−1+εt. (4.20)
There are eight exogenous variables in the vector st. They are the response of the monetary
authority to monetary shocks, ˆ xM,t, the monetary shock, εµz,t, the growth rate of neutral
technology, ˆ µz,t, the shock to the growth rate of neutral technology, εµz,t, the response of the
monetary authority to neutral technology shocks, ˆ xz,t, the growth rate of embodied technology,
ˆ µ¡,t the shock to the growth rate of embodied technology, εµ¡,t, and the response of the monetary












































. The parameters in the P matrix come
from the processes governing technological progress (equations 4.6 and 4.7) and the monetary
policy rule (equations 4.16 to 4.18). As described earlier, they are calibrated so that the model
responses ﬁt the responses from a VAR.
Once we specify a series for each of the three shocks, the exogenous variables are
determined. Each series of shocks is 1,000 periods long to facilitate the computation of the
present value of these events. We simulate our model for these 1,000 periods.
234.8 Measuring resilience
We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the resilience of a model economy under given
market rigidities. Each parameterisation is run 10,000 times with a new series of exogenous












The mean of the 10,000 discounted utilities recorded was calculated to give us the expected
discounted utility.
245 Results
The effects of varying degrees of rigidity on expected utility can be seen in ﬁgure 5.1. The
baseline set of parameters is given the value zero in the ﬁgures. The price and wage rigidity
parameters vary from the baseline to fully ﬂexible (all agents reset their wage every period),
which is given the value 100 in the ﬁgures, to fully inﬂexible, which is given the value -100.
Capital adjustment costs are also represented in a similar way in the ﬁgures. The baseline capital
adjustment cost is given the value zero, no adjustment costs are given the value 100 and costs
twice the baseline level are given the value -100. In the ﬁgures, all rigidity parameters are
adjusted at equal intervals (ie. wage, price and capital rigidity are all set at -50). The results
demonstrate that there is no discernable relationship between the rigidity parameters and the
level of expected utility when all three shocks are simulated together. The ﬁgure is not smooth,
however, indicating that the accuracy of 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations of the three shocks is
only sufﬁcient to distinguish between changes of expected utility in the region of 0.5% of the
baseline level - the y-axes go from approximately 99% of the baseline level of utility to 101%.
The remaining three ﬁgures shows that this lack of accuracy is caused mainly by the neutral
technology shocks, since that is the only one displaying a similar variation across the
parameterisations. The ﬁgure for the money shocks is virtually a smooth straight line. The
exception is the very inﬂexible case where prices and wages have less than a 1% chance of
adjusting each period, this results in slightly lower expected utility. As with the simulations for
all shocks, the simulations with neutral technology shocks display no discernable relationship
between ﬂexibility and expected utility. The same is true for embodied shocks.
As a consequence of ﬁnding no relationship when combining the rigidities it is of little
interest to look at the rigidity parameters individually. They demonstrate the same lack of
relationship and are not shown.
An important point to note, however, is that if we were to choose a different deﬁnition of
resilience we would get a different conclusion. Figure 5.2 shows the responses of output,
consumption, hours worked and capacity utilisation to a monetary policy shock. As the
ﬂexibility parameters are changed from very inﬂexible (less 100 in the ﬁgure), through the
baseline speciﬁcation to very ﬂexible (more 100), the responses of the macroeconomic
aggregates become signiﬁcantly smaller and less persistent. Had we taken the deﬁnition
employed by Drew et al. we would have concluded that market rigidities were very important for
resilience. This is in stark contrast to our conclusion.
So why is there no relationship between expected utility and the rigidity parameters, even
though we observe marked differences in the responses of the aggregates? Since monetary
shocks are random and temporary, positive and negative shocks will average each other out in
the long run in terms of deviations from the steady state quantity of money. The utility effects
depend on two things: 1) how consumption and hours vary in response to money shocks and 2)







-100 -50 0 50 100







-100 -50 0 50 100
Flexibility (0 = Baseline, 100 = Flexible)






-100 -50 0 50 100
Flexibility (0 = Baseline, 100 = Flexible)






-100 -50 0 50 100
Flexibility (0 = Baseline, 100 = Flexible)
how utility varies with changing hours and consumption. The log linearised model is symmetric
around the steady state. Therefore the responses of consumption and hours to money shocks are
also symmetrical; they too cancel each other out on average. However, the variation of utility
with the variation in consumption and hours is not symmetric. The effect of consumption on
utility is logarithmic and the effect of hours is quadratic. The reason why we observe such a
small effect is that these are almost linear in the region of the steady state for the magnitude of
shocks we investigate. That is why the utility effects of the rigidity parameters is so small.
Two ways of getting around this spring readily to mind: either make the distribution of the
monetary shocks asymmetric or move away from log utility. Neither of these is particularly
attractive. The model is calibrated to and based on normally distributed shocks from the VAR
model. Whilst there is evidence that monetary policy shocks are not normally distributed, 1 there
is little evidence that they are asymmetric. Moving away from log utility is not attractive either
since log utility is required for the model to be consistent with balanced growth (King, Plosser
and Rebelo, 1988). If one wants to look at adjustment to technology shocks in a model that
reproduces real world data with growth one needs to start from a model with a balanced growth
1 The literature suggests that monetary policy shocks are leptokurtic, ie. they are symmetric but with fatter tails than a
normal distribution (see Siegfried, 2002).
26Figure 5.2 Effect of market rigidities on the responses of key variables to a monetary policy shock. Rigidities
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path; hence log utility cannot be avoided. Our original focus was on technology shocks;
technology shocks are difﬁcult to interpret outside of a balanced growth model. However, if we
wish to focus solely on the responses to monetary shocks we can get away from log utility and
penalise deviations from steady state consumption more heavily.
In light of this, we adjusted household preferences in an attempt to penalise deviations from
steady state more than under log utility. To that end we have replaced log utility with constant





















In the case where σp = 1 this utility function is equivalent to log utility. However, this has little
effect on the results. As agents become less tolerant of deviations of consumption from the
steady state level, they choose not to alter consumption in response to monetary shocks, since
these are known to be stationary, zero mean shocks. This can clearly be seen in ﬁgure 5.3.
Hence, the effect of these shocks on expected utility is limited.
27Figure 5.3 The effect of changing the curvature of the utility function on the responses to a money shock. The
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In order to gauge the effects of changing the curvature of the utility function on utility we need
to specify an initial level of consumption. The change in utility from equal percentage changes
in consumption depends on the initial level on consumption, except in the log utility case.
Starting from a technology level equal to one we calculate the utility in each period associated
with remaining at the steady state. Then, in each period after the shock, we calculate the average
utility from a positive and a negative shock, where both shocks are one standard deviation.
Comparing this average to the level of utility in each period when there are no shocks, we take
the maximum difference and calculate the discounted sum to inﬁnity (using the discount rate set
in the Altig et al. model) of being this far away from the steady state forever. The results are
shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2. The total possible gain over the baseline scenario is the baseline
loss, which equals 0.000777. Altering the curvature of the utility function does not greatly alter
the possible gain since the maximum loss that occurs when σp = 0.2 is only about 1.5 times
greater than the baseline loss. Hence changing the utility function does not mean that shocks are
much more costly in utility terms and, consequently, the effect of the rigidity parameters on
expected utility will also remain small. What we can say from tables 5.1 and 5.2 is that the
utility loss is lower in the fully ﬂexible economy than in both the baseline and fully inﬂexible
economies. In fact, the utility loss in the ﬂexible economy is less than 1% of the utility loss in
the baseline scenario.
To further illustrate the small magnitude of the effect of rigidities on expected utility, it is of
interest to compare the potential magnitude of utility gain from removing variation around the
steady-state with the effects of increasing competition. Increasing product market competition
by reducing the competition parameter, λf, from 1.01 to 1.009 increases the level of utility by
0.0015 in each period when preferences are logarithmic in utility (ie. σp = 1). This is 100 times
larger than the total utility loss per period of 0.0000115 due to monetary shocks. Hence, making
the economy more ﬂexible is less important than competition policy.
28Table 5.1 The effect of changing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on per period utility loss
σp Baseline economy Flexible economy Inﬂexible economy
0.2 1.85E-05 1.01E-07 3.79E-05
0.4 1.68E-05 9.17E-08 3.66E-05
0.6 1.43E-05 7.86E-08 2.84E-05
0.8 1.26E-05 6.98E-08 2.4E-05
1.0 1.15E-05 6.34E-08 2.11E-05
1.2 1.08E-05 5.86E-08 1.9E-05
1.4 1.04E-05 5.49E-08 1.75E-05
1.6 1.01E-05 5.2E-08 1.63E-05
1.8 9.89E-06 4.96E-08 1.54E-05
2.0 9.69E-06 4.76E-08 1.46E-05
Table 5.2 The effect of changing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on expected utility loss
σp Baseline economy Flexible economy Inﬂexible economy
0.2 0.001249 6.81E-06 0.00256
0.4 0.001133 6.19E-06 0.002476
0.6 0.000963 5.31E-06 0.001919
0.8 0.000852 4.71E-06 0.001619
1.0 0.000777 4.28E-06 0.001425
1.2 0.000727 3.96E-06 0.001286
1.4 0.000703 3.71E-06 0.001183
1.6 0.000684 3.51E-06 0.001103
1.8 0.000668 3.35E-06 0.001039
2.0 0.000655 3.22E-06 0.000986
29306 Resilience and the costs of business cycles
As we saw in the previous section, the effect of shocks on utility is limited in our model. Since
these shocks are the only sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations in our model, our conclusion
could be rephrased as the costs of business cycles are small. This subject has received
considerable attention in the literature. Lucas (1987) studied the costs of business cycles by
calculating how much lifetime consumption an individual would be willing to give up to face a
certain future consumption stream rather than a volatile stream. Using a constant relative risk
aversion utility function he concluded that the costs of business cycles are small. He calculated
that individuals would give up at most 0.1% of lifetime consumption to remove business cycles.
The cause of this result is that there is very little uncertainty regarding the time path of aggregate
consumption: in recessions consumption is 1-2% below trend and in booms 1-2% above trend.
In essence this is the same result that we have found.
Lucas’ results are controversial in that they imply that business cycles are relatively
unimportant, a view not accepted easily in the literature. Barlevy (2005) reviews the response to
Lucas’ paper. Barlevy argues that the responses can be grouped into four themes: 1) changing
the utility function, 2) using household data rather than aggregate data, 3) models where
stabilisation causes a level shift in output and 4) models where stabilisation affects the
steady-state growth rate. Following Barlevy, we subsequently discuss these strands.
Barlevy concludes that most studies with different utility functions still result in low costs of
business cycles. The exception is Tallarini (2000). Tallarini uses a preference structure that
separates intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion (with constant relative risk
aversion preferences the coefﬁcient of risk aversion is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution). This speciﬁcation of utility is consistent with equity market data since they can
generate a high equity risk premium. Once this is done, the costs of business cycles are much
greater. However, the result depends on very high levels of risk aversion.
Another strand of literature argues that the aggregate level of risk is the wrong measure since
this averages out the much greater variance of income for individual households due to
unemployment, especially for different income groups (see, for example, Mukoyama and Sahin,
2006). This strand relies on capital market imperfections to translate the greater variance of
individual income into greater variance for consumption. If individuals can borrow freely when
they are unemployed individual consumption is as smooth as aggregate consumption. Since poor
households with low savings rates are more likely to be credit constrained than richer
households, business cycle costs are higher for them than those with higher savings. Barlevy
concludes that the costs of business cycles for poor households could be between 4 and 7% of
lifetime consumption, whilst the overall ﬁgure based on individual modelling is around 2.5%.
For some households the costs of business cycles may even be negative due to the effect of
business cycles on interest rates.
31The third strand argues that stabilisation has an effect on the level of output and consumption.
One explanation is that unemployment may respond asymmetrically across the cycle, so
stabilising output reduces the unemployment level (see, for example, Yellen and Akerlof, 2004).
Barlevy concludes that the costs of lower output might be as large as 2 percent of lifetime
consumption but there is a large degree of uncertainty.
It is also possible that, by reducing uncertainty, investment increases and the rate of growth
of the economy is increased. This is not a clear cut argument, however, since reducing
uncertainty will lower precautionary saving and raise interest rates. Furthermore, Schleifer
(1986) argues that ﬁrms invest in order to capture the excess proﬁts in booms. If the cycle were
smoothed out there would be less incentive to invest and slower growth. Barlevy concludes that
stability can potentially raise growth rates and have a large effect on welfare, but that the exact
effects of stabilisation are highly uncertain in this regard.
These approaches also have the potential to generate more importance for resilience in our
model and point the way to interesting future work. The results suggest that further changing the
utility function in our model is unlikely to alter the results. Having unemployment in our model
would open up many different ways of looking at resilience, allowing us a sensible way to look
at asymmetric effects across the cycle. Introducing heterogeneous agents in our model could
potentially allow policy to have an effect on the level of utility. It would also allow us to
potentially gauge trade offs between different groups in society, since some may value resilience
more highly than others. Furthermore, those channels that work through interest rates will work
differently for the Netherlands. As a small open economy these effects will work through the
external balance rather than interest rates, which may induce different effects.
327 Unemployment and the other limitations of our DSGE model
7.1 The main limitations
A small theoretical model will be unable to both remain small and investigate all facets of
resilience; the Altig et al. model is no exception. We list the major limitations to our current
study below.
• The ﬁrst limitation is that labour markets clear. The model does not allow for unemployment.
We could interpret a fall in aggregate hours as akin to higher unemployment. This, however,
does not improve the discussion: a fall in aggregate hours increases utility in our model, which is
at odds with the conventional view that unemployment is bad. This limitation is possibly the
most restrictive of the limitations listed here as it signiﬁcantly reduces the suitability of our
DSGE model to investigate resilience. DSGE models with unemployment exist, for example
Bodart et al. (2006) and Christoffel et al. (2007). However, not all models would be suitable for
studying resilience. For example, the latter model does not contain technology shocks, the
response to which is important in the resilience literature. Furthermore, any model would need
to incorporate credit frictions and at least some of the other points discussed in section 6,
otherwise it would only be possible to draw the same conclusion as in the present study.
• A related issue is that of multiple equilibria: the log-linearised model presented here only has a
single steady state. This means that the model economy will return to the same equilibrium
following a given shock. In reality, this need not be the case. One of the most commonly cited
reasons for multiple equilibria is hysteresis, whereby unemployed workers lose skills and
subsequently have less chance of ﬁnding a new job. This leads to a permanently higher
unemployment level and lower output. Matching models of unemployment, whereby workers
and ﬁrms have to search to ﬁnd a good match between worker and ﬁrm, often have this feature
(See Den Haan, 2002 and Den Haan et al., 2001, for examples of matching models with multiple
unemployment equilibria). In a world with multiple equilibria, a resilient economy is one that
minimises the chance of ending up in bad equilbria. As mentioned earlier, we can’t address this
issue in the present model since the log-linearised model does not have multiple equilibria. 2
• A third limitation is that the model presented here behaves symmetrically around the steady
state. The log-linearisation employed to simulate model forces this to be the case. Hence there is
virtually no difference between the effects of positive and negative shocks. This limitation is also
linked to the previous limitation because one can think of multple equilibria as a type of
asymmetry. That is, a negative shock from a good equilibrium may leave the economy in the bad
2 The discussion above does not apply solely to labour, it also applies to the other factor of production, capital. If
economic downturns cause ﬁrms to go bankrupt and it takes time for the assets of a bankrupt ﬁrm to be released and
reused, then the capital of the ﬁrm is also unemployed for a period of time. Den Haan et al. (2003) develop a matching
model for business that can result in multiple equilibira due to costs of bankruptcies.
33equilibrium.
• The number of shocks modelled is the fourth limitation. The sources of shocks are limited to just
a money shock and the two technology shocks. The model does not answer questions relating to
subjects such as increased competition from Chinese goods or Indian services. It also doesn’t
incorporate a role for oil price shocks. Furthermore, the current paper does not address other
signiﬁcant issues such as the response of an economy to a large unexpected inﬂux of labour, for
example.
• The model exhibits limited inter-sectoral adjustments. Perhaps, one of the key elements of
resilience is the ability of an economy to close old industries and move workers into new
industries. This is not included in our model.
• The current model does not attempt to analyse the effects of policy on the variance of utility.
There exists a large literature on optimal stabilisation policy and it is not our intention to repeat
these exercises here. The model presented here only discusses how an economy adjusts to
shocks. In that sense it ignores the crucial question of how can policy be implemented to
minimise the incidence of shocks.
7.2 Market rigidities in the Netherlands: empirical evidence
Our interest ultimately lies in analysing the resilience of the Dutch economy. In order to do this
we would need to extend the current model along the lines suggested in sections 6 and 7. We
would also need to calibrate the model to the Netherlands. On this latter point there is already
some research that we can compare to the parameters used in the current study. This comparison
is fruitful in that we have seen that the ﬂexibility of an economy determines the magnitude of the
responses of the main macroeconomic variables to shocks (see ﬁgure 5.2). A model adapted
along the lines discussed in sections 6 and 7 may display larger utility effects.
There is some disagreement in the empirical literature over how ﬂexible nominal wages in
the Netherlands are. Van der Welle and Den Butter (2005) conclude on the basis of studies of
OECD (1999, 2000) and the European Commission (2003) that the Netherlands has the smallest
nominal wage ﬂexibility of all European countries. Other studies (Layard et al, 1998, Teulings
and Hartog, 1998), however, ﬁnd that the Netherlands belong to the group of most ﬂexible
countries in terms of nominal wages. These results seem to suggest that conclusions regarding
the relative nominal wage ﬂexibility of the Netherlands are not robust to various model
speciﬁcations.
Hoeberichts and Stokman (2006) report survey results on the frequency of price changes in
the Netherlands. Their value of once every 12 months on average is less ﬂexible than the
baseline value from the Altig et al. model. They report a value of once every 4-5 months, which
concerns the US. This baseline value falls within the range of price ﬂexibility reported for the
US by Bils and Klenow (2004), Golosov and Lucas (2003) and Klenow and Kryvtsov ( 2005).
34These three studies report estimates in the range of once every 3-6 months. Moreover, the
Hoeberichts and Stokman study reports that ﬁrms review their prices much more often than they
actually change them. Whether the frequency of changes or the frequency of reviews is more
appropriate for comparison to the reoptimisation frequency in the model is unclear. Hoeberichts
and Stokman also report that ﬁrms in more competitive markets change their prices more
frequently than those in less competitive markets. In New Keynesian DSGE models competition
and the effects of nominal rigidity are linked.
Montfort, Den Butter and Weitenberg (2003) conclude that in particular productivity/
technology shocks are slowly and not completely absorbed. More speciﬁcally, Balmaseda,
Dolado and Lopez-Salido (2000) calculate the effects of a productivity shock on unemployment
and real wages (with SVAR-model) for different countries. Their calculations suggest that the
Netherlands has relatively more difﬁculty absorbing productivity shocks (compared to the
capacity to absorb wage shocks).
Difﬁculties in estimating capital adjustment costs (see, for example, Hall, 2004, who argues
that capital adjustment costs are small in the US, or see Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996, who list
many studies that ﬁnd sizeable capital adjustment costs in the US) make it hard to make a
meaningful comparison between the Netherlands and the US. However, we can speculate that
capital adjustment costs are higher in the Netherlands than in the US due to smaller capital
markets in the Netherlands (see data in Cecchetti, 1999, for example), which make ﬁnancing
adjustments more difﬁcult. Moreover, there is also evidence that capital adjustments go
hand-in-hand with labour adjustments, since ﬁrms that want to use more capital will also want
more labour to use the capital (see Letterie et al., 2004, which implies that the restrictions on
hiring and ﬁring labour in the Netherlands will likely raise capital adjustment costs too).
Whether the difference in capital adjustment costs is enough to make a difference in the analysis
is unclear.
35368 Conclusion
We have used the model of Altig et al. (2005) to analyse the resilience of a model economy to
shocks and this depends on speciﬁc market rigidities. We chose the level of expected utility as
our measure of resilience, noting that this is therefore consistent with agent preferences in the
model. Simulations suggested the effects of capital adjustment costs, nominal price and nominal
wage rigidities on the level of expected utility are small, especially when compared to the effects
of market competition or economic growth on the level of utility. This is because the latter shift
the steady state position of the economy whilst the former only affects the position of the
economy around the steady state following a given shock.
In light of this, we suggest that any realistic analysis of the resilience of an economy requires
a model to include unemployment and imperfect credit markets. Not only does lower
equilibrium unemployment induce an effect on the level of output in the economy but modelling
unemployment also moves away from equal, across the board effects on hours following shocks.
In the present model an economic downturn gives all agents a few hours extra leisure time,
which they like. In reality, the effect of downturns on hours is unequally distributed: most people
work a similar number of hours, some work no hours and have very low income. Another
necessary step towards a realistic analysis of the resilience of the Dutch economy is calibrating
the model to Dutch data.
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